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Intellectual disability is a condition, not a number. 
  —Justice Kennedy1 
INTRODUCTION 
n the United States, approximately 6.5 million people are afflicted 
with an intellectual disability.2 Intellectually disabled persons 
represent 4%–10% of the prison population.3 An intellectually disabled 
person experiences limited cognitive functioning and abilities, which 
impinges upon the person’s communication, social, and self-
sufficiency skills.4 While intellectually disabled persons generally 
understand the difference between right and wrong and are capable of 
standing trial, their impairments lead them to have a diminished 
personal culpability for their actions since “they often act on impulse 
rather than pursuant to a premeditated plan, and . . . in group settings 
they are followers rather than leaders.”5 As a result, intellectually 
disabled persons may be more susceptible to committing and assisting 
in criminal activity to feel accepted and create friendships.6 Yet, these 
intellectually disabled individuals generally face significant 
 
1 Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986, 2001 (2014). 
2 What is Intellectual Disability?, SPECIAL OLYMPICS, http://www.specialolympics.org 
/Sections/Who_We_Are/What_Is_Intellectual_Disability.aspx (last visited Feb. 4, 2016). 
3 Leigh Ann Davis, People with Intellectual Disabilities in the Criminal Justice Systems: 
Victims & Suspects, THE ARC (Aug. 2009), http://www.thearc.org/document.doc ?id=3664. 
4 SPECIAL OLYMPICS, supra note 2. 
5 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 318 (2002). 
6 Davis, supra note 3. 
I
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disadvantages in the criminal justice system since they “are more likely 
to be arrested, convicted, sentenced to prison and victimized in 
prison.”7 
The U.S. Supreme Court sought to acknowledge these disadvantages 
in Atkins v. Virginia, where it held that the execution of intellectually 
disabled persons is unconstitutional.8 For a capital defendant 
presenting a defense of intellectual disability, “the finding of mental 
retardation is like a dispositive mitigating factor.”9 The defendant’s 
intellectual disability claim does not enhance the penalty for the alleged 
crime he faces.10 Instead, a finding of intellectual disability limits the 
defendant’s maximum penalty to a term of imprisonment.11 Further, 
under Atkins, intellectual disability is not limited to those with extreme 
cognitive impairment.12 Rather, intellectual disability extends to 
defendants with lower cognitive functioning. As such, capital 
defendants eligible to be spared the death penalty are those who 
experience “diminished capacities to understand and process 
information, to communicate, to abstract from mistakes and learn from 
experience, to engage in logical reasoning, to control impulses, and to 
understand the reactions of others.”13 
In 2014, in Hall v. Florida, the Court broadened the impact of the 
Atkins case. Freddie Hall, a man allegedly burdened by a violent and 
abusive childhood,14 and his accomplice were charged with killing a 
pregnant woman with the intent of using her vehicle to commit a 
robbery.15 Thereafter, in the process of the robbery, Hall was involved 
in the murder of a sheriff’s deputy.16 Hall was subsequently sentenced 
to death for both murders.17 In response, Hall presented a defense of 
intellectual disability.18 The Court confronted the issue of whether a 
rigid IQ requirement of 70 should be the sole determinant of an 
 
7 Id. 
8 Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321. 
9 State v. Jimenez, 908 A.2d 181, 190 (N.J. 2006). 
10 Id. 
11 Id. 
12 93 AM. JUR. TRIALS Capital Cases Involving Mental Retardation § 4, Westlaw 
(database updated Oct. 2015). 
13 Atkins, 536 U.S. at 318. 
14 Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986, 1991 (2014). 
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individual’s eligibility to pursue his intellectual disability defense, 
thereby standing as a potential bar to prevent a capital defendant from 
submitting further evidence.19 
The Court held that Florida’s IQ cutoff for determining a defendant’s 
eligibility to be spared the death penalty due to intellectual disability is 
unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment.20 The Court also 
asserted that due to the intrinsic impreciseness of IQ tests, ranges of IQ 
scores should be considered in evaluating an individual for intellectual 
disability.21 However, the Court provided little guidance for how state 
legislatures should reform their intellectual disability statutes to avoid 
the fate of Florida’s inflexible interpretation. 
This Note outlines the legal, moral, and social implications of the 
Hall decision. Additionally, it provides possible responses to the 
questions left unanswered by Hall regarding the need to remedy the 
relationship between the intellectually disabled community and the 
criminal justice system. Part I provides the Florida Supreme Court’s 
interpretation of its statutory definition of “intellectual disability.” Part 
II explores the procedural history of Hall and elaborates on Freddie 
Hall’s troubled childhood. The depiction of Hall’s childhood 
demonstrates the type of evidence that would be barred by failing to 
fulfill the Florida IQ requirement. Part III outlines the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s holding and rationale. In Hall, the Court rejected Florida’s rule 
that the defendant must first fall below a strict IQ threshold before 
being allowed to present additional evidence of intellectual disability.22 
The Court reasoned that the rule was inconsistent with medical 
professionals’ opinions,23 violated each American citizen’s Eighth 
Amendment rights,24 and that “every state legislature . . . has taken a 
position contrary to that of Florida.”25 
Part IV illustrates the consequences of the Hall decision. Hall places 
pressure on the Florida legislature and other states to develop a more 
sound interpretation of intellectual disability and to consider other 
measures of intellectual functioning besides an IQ test. Additionally, 
the decision may also have immediate consequences for inmates on 
death row that have the potential to bring intellectual disability claims. 
 
19 Id. 
20 Id. at 2001. 
21 Id. 
22 Id. 
23 Id. at 1995. 
24 Id. at 1992–93. 
25 Id. at 1996–98. 
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Lastly, Part V provides recommendations that states can use when 
reconsidering their intellectual disability statutes to ensure consistency 
with the Hall decision. The suggestions include implementing a 
factors-based test, developing the three branches of learning to better 
understand the complexities of intellectual disability, creating a more 
comprehensive test based on the Diagnostic Adaptive Behavior Scale, 
and establishing a panel of medical and mental health professionals to 
evaluate capital defendants. 
I 
FLORIDA LAW 
Chapter 921, section 137 of the Florida Statutes, which defines the 
parameters where imposition of the death sentence upon an 
intellectually disabled person is prohibited, states: 
 (1) As used in this section, the term “intellectually disabled” or 
“intellectual disability” means significantly subaverage general 
intellectual functioning existing concurrently with deficits in 
adaptive behavior and manifested during the period from conception 
to age 18. The term “significantly subaverage general intellectual 
functioning,” for the purpose of this section, means performance that 
is two or more standard deviations from the mean score on a 
standardized intelligence test specified in the rules of the Agency for 
Persons with Disabilities. . . .26 
The Florida Supreme Court clarified the statutory definition in 
Cherry v. Florida, finding that in order for a defendant to be recognized 
as intellectually disabled, the defendant must satisfy three prongs: (1) 
deficient intellectual functioning; (2) significant adaptive behavior 
limitations; and (3) these deficits must be present before the defendant 
is eighteen years old.27 Satisfying the first prong depends on a 
defendant’s performance on an IQ test.28 Accordingly, the Florida 
Supreme Court narrowly interpreted section 921.137(1) to mean that 
any defendant whose IQ score is greater than 70 is not characterized as 
being intellectually disabled.29 Consequently, that defendant is barred 
from presenting further evidence of his limited adaptive behavior—the 
second prong—to demonstrate his intellectual disability claim.30 
 
26 FLA. STAT. § 921.137(1) (2015). 
27 See Cherry v. State, 959 So. 2d 702, 711 (Fla. 2007). 
28 Id. at 711–13. 
29 Id. at 712–13. 
30 Id. at 714. 
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Although the Florida Supreme Court acknowledged the “universally 
accepted given fact” that IQ is reported as a range of scores and a +/–5 
standard of error is considered when determining if an individual is 
intellectually disabled, the Court still imposed the bright-line, 70-point 
cutoff.31 Thus, Hall considers the constitutionality of Florida’s strict 
IQ threshold as determinative of a defendant’s intellectual disability 
claim. 
II 
FACTS OF HALL 
On February 21, 1978, Freddie Hall and his accomplice, Mack 
Ruffin, accosted Karol Hurst, a seven-month-pregnant, twenty-one-
year-old housewife, in a grocery store parking lot in Sumter County.32 
With the intention of using Hurst’s car to commit a robbery, Hall and 
Ruffin forced Hurst into her car and drove to a wooded area.33 
Thereafter, Hall alleged that, “Ruffin beat, sexually assaulted, and shot 
Mrs. Hurst.”34 
Hall and Ruffin proceeded to a convenience store in Hernando 
County, where their presence raised the store clerk’s suspicions and the 
clerk alerted the sheriff’s office.35 Prior to Deputy Lonnie Coburn’s 
arrival, Hall and Ruffin exited the store, and shortly thereafter, the clerk 
heard a gunshot and discovered Deputy Coburn dead behind the 
store.36 Although Deputy Coburn’s weapon was missing, the weapon 
found to have killed Hurst was discovered under the deputy’s body.37 
Hall and Ruffin fled the scene in Hurst’s vehicle, but after law 
enforcement pursued the men, Hall and Ruffin abandoned the car and 
fled on foot.38 Law enforcement soon apprehended the men and 
discovered Deputy Coburn’s pistol, as well as Hurst’s handbag and 
groceries, in the abandoned car.39 
The circuit court convicted Hall for first-degree murder of both 
Hurst and Deputy Coburn.40 Hall was sentenced to death for each 
 
31 Id. at 712–13. 








40 Id. at 1322; Hall v. State (Hall I (Coburn)), 403 So. 2d 1319, 1321 (Fla. 1981). 
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murder; he subsequently appealed both convictions.41 The sentence for 
Deputy Coburn’s death was later reduced due to insufficient evidence 
to sustain the conviction.42 Nonetheless, the Florida Supreme Court 
affirmed Hall’s conviction and sentence for the murder of Hurst.43 In 
September 1982, Hall’s death warrant was signed, scheduling him for 
execution.44 Following Hall’s first sentencing, the U.S. Supreme Court 
held in Hitchcock v. Dugger that defendants must be provided the 
opportunity to present nonstatutory mitigating evidence in death 
penalty proceedings.45 Thereafter, Hall petitioned the court for a writ 
of habeas corpus, claiming that the death sentence proceedings 
afforded to him violated the Hitchcock ruling.46 The Florida Supreme 
Court denied Hall’s petition because even though the jury and court 
had only considered the statutorily enumerated mitigating 
circumstances, any sentencing proceeding errors were harmless.47 Hall 
filed a subsequent motion to vacate his sentence, alleging “that his 
sentencing proceeding was fundamentally flawed under the Hitchcock 
ruling.”48 
Accordingly, the Florida Supreme Court considered nonstatutory 
mitigating evidence presented by Hall at the 3.850 hearing to determine 
if a Hitchcock error had occurred.49 This evidence was based on 
affidavits from both experts and nonexperts, which Hall had used in an 
attempt to prove his intellectual disability and incompetency to stand 
trial.50 Dr. George Barnard advised that while Hall was competent to 
stand trial, there was evidence of a “long history of drug and alcohol 
abuse, child abuse amounting to torture, organic brain damage possibly 
resulting from severe, repeated head trauma suffered as a child and 
adolescent, and a very low intellectual level.”51 Hall was also 
determined to be an illiterate adult that “suffered from extreme mental 
and emotional disturbance, compounded significantly by substance 
 
41 Hall I (Hurst), 403 So. 2d at 1322–23; Hall I (Coburn), 403 So. 2d at 1319. 
42 Hall I (Coburn), 403 So. 2d at 1321. 
43 Hall I (Hurst), 403 So. 2d at 1325. 
44 Hall v. State (Hall III), 541 So. 2d 1125, 1126 (Fla. 1989). 
45 Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393, 398–99 (1987). 
46 Hall v. Dugger (Hall II), 531 So. 2d 76, 77 (Fla. 1988). 
47 Id. 
48 Hall III, 541 So. 2d at 1126. 
49 Id. Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 governs motions to vacate, set aside, or 
correct sentences. 
50 Id. 
51 Id. at 1126–27. 
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abuse throughout his life and at the time of the offense,” according to 
psychologist and American Board of Professional Psychology 
diplomate, Dr. Jethro Toomer.52 Furthermore, psychiatrist Dr. Dorothy 
Lewis concluded that Hall’s condition was consistent with 
schizophrenic disorder and Hall’s “violent child abuse, organic brain 
damage, paranoia, and continued substance abuse all contributed to 
Hall’s conduct at the time of the murder.”53 
Hall was one of seventeen siblings, and the affidavits submitted by 
some of Hall’s siblings depict the Hall children’s upbringing as one 
subjected to poverty, violence, brutality, and parents who relentlessly 
fought with dangerous weapons.54 Thus, “Hall’s childhood was 
marked by an existence which can only be described as pitiful,” and 
both his siblings and teachers characterized Hall as “mentally 
retarded.”55 Despite Hall’s deficits, Hall’s mother did not sympathize 
with him but instead gave his father and neighbors “permission to beat 
Hall whenever they deemed [punishment] proper.”56 For instance, 
“Hall’s mother would strap him to his bed at night, with a rope thrown 
over a rafter. In the morning, she would awaken Hall by hoisting him 
up and whipping him with a belt, rope, or chord.”57 Consequently, the 
Florida Supreme Court agreed that a Hitchcock error had occurred.58 
The court then vacated Hall’s death sentence and remanded the case to 
the trial court to conduct a new sentencing proceeding before a new 
jury, where Hall could present nonstatutory mitigating evidence of his 
intellectual disability.59 
Upon remand and consideration of the aforementioned nonstatutory 
mitigating evidence, the circuit court again sentenced Hall to death.60 
Despite the circuit court concluding that there was significant evidence 
to support Hall’s claim that he had been characterized as mentally 
retarded for his entire life, the court could not disregard Hall’s moral 
culpability for the crimes committed on the basis of his mental 
difficulties.61 The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court, 
 






58 Id. at 1126. 
59 Id. at 1128. 
60 Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct 1986, 1991 (2014). 
61 Id. 
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resentencing Hall to death.62 When Hall sought post-conviction relief, 
the circuit court denied Hall such relief63 and the Florida Supreme 
Court affirmed.64 
In 2002, the U.S. Supreme Court held in Atkins that the Eighth 
Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment bans the 
execution of intellectually disabled defendants.65 The Court reasoned 
that “death is not a suitable punishment for a mentally retarded 
criminal” and it is not likely “that the execution of mentally retarded 
criminals will measurably advance the deterrent or the retributive 
purpose of the death penalty.”66 As a result of the Atkins decision, states 
were responsible for defining intellectual disability.67 
On November 30, 2004, Hall filed a motion alleging that he was 
intellectually disabled under Atkins and could not be executed.68 Hall 
reasoned that the Florida statute, which set an IQ score of 70 points as 
a minimum to determine intellectual disability, was unconstitutional 
and could not properly gauge his mental capacity.69 After a lengthy 
delay, on March 27, 2008, the Florida Supreme Court held an 
evidentiary hearing to consider Hall’s motion, which claimed that he is 
intellectually disabled based on Atkins.70 At the hearing, Hall presented 
evidence to demonstrate his intellectual disability and his IQ test result 
of 71.71 Furthermore, Hall “allege[d] that his IQ should be read as a 
range of scores from 67 to 75 and that this Court’s adoption of a firm 
cutoff of 70 or below to qualify as mentally retarded misapplie[d] the 
Supreme Court’s ruling in Atkins and fail[ed] to reflect an 
understanding of IQ testing.”72 The Florida Supreme Court denied 
Hall’s appeal and held that Florida’s 70-point threshold to determine 
 
62 Hall v. State (Hall IV), 614 So. 2d 473, 479 (Fla. 1993). 
63 Hall v. State (Hall V), 742 So. 2d 225, 225 (Fla. 1999). 
64 Id. at 230. 
65 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002). 
66 Id. 
67 Id. at 317. 
68 Hall v. State (Hall VI), 109 So. 3d 704, 706–07 (Fla. 2012), rev’d, 134 S. Ct. 1986 
(2014). 
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intellectual disability was constitutional.73 The U.S. Supreme Court 
granted certiorari.74 
III 
HOLDING AND RATIONALE OF HALL 
In a 5-4 ruling, the U.S. Supreme Court held Florida’s bright-line 
rule invalid under the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and 
unusual punishment.75 The Court rejected Florida’s rule because it (1) 
disregards the views of medical professionals;76 (2) violates each 
American citizen’s inherent right to dignity as a human being;77 and 
(3) fails to coincide with other states’ interpretations.78 
A. Florida’s Rule Does Not Comply with Medical Professionals’ 
Views 
First, Florida’s rule, section 921.137(1), does not comply with the 
views of the medical professionals who design, administer, and analyze 
the IQ test. Due to the impreciseness of IQ tests, these medical 
professionals reason that IQ scores should be assessed as a range, not a 
single, fixed number.79 The Court cited the American Psychological 
Association’s (APA) amicus brief at length throughout its opinion to 
illustrate how Florida’s rigid IQ threshold “creates an unacceptable risk 
that persons with intellectual disability will be executed.”80 The APA 
asserted that IQ scores are subject to variability due to external factors 
that are separate from the test taker’s ability.81 Accordingly, a capital 
defendant who takes an IQ test multiple times is susceptible to test 
practice effects, meaning he is likely to learn to perform the tasks, thus 
jeopardizing the accuracy of such intelligence tests.82 In turn, “[t]his 
 
73 Id. at 707–08. 
74 Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986, 1992 (2014). 
75 Id. at 2001. 
76 Id. at 1995. 
77 Id. at 1992–93. 
78 Id. at 1998. 
79 Id. at 1995. 
80 Id. at 1990. 
81 Brief of American Psychological Association et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Petitioner at 22, Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986 (2014) (No. 12-10882) [hereinafter APA 
Brief]. 
82 John Matthew Fabian et al., Life, Death, and IQ: It’s Much More than Just a Score: 
Understanding and Utilizing Forensic Psychological and Neuropsychological Evaluations 
in Atkins Intellectual Disability/Mental Retardation Cases, 59 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 399, 416 
(2011). 
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variation reduces the reliability of the scores produced by the testing 
instrument because it reduces the confidence a clinician has that the 
score accurately reflects the test taker’s true abilities.”83 For instance, 
Freddie Hall took the IQ test nine times over the course of forty years, 
resulting in scores between 60 and 80 points.84 Consequently, Hall’s 
vast range in test results seems to undermine the IQ test’s reliability as 
a determining factor of intellectual disability. 
In order to account for the IQ test’s variability in results and compute 
the test’s reliability, which includes its precision, consistency, and 
repeatability, the clinician calculates the test’s standard error of 
measurement (SEM).85 The SEM calculates the statistical confidence 
interval in which the test taker’s score falls.86 According to the 
American Association on Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities 
(AAIDD) Manual, an individual severely lacking intellectual 
functioning abilities is defined by test results that fall within two 
standard deviations below the mean.87 However, an IQ test result 
falling within two standard deviations below the mean is not a rigid 
cutoff for classifying an individual’s cognitive abilities.88 Thus, 
“[r]eporting the range within which the person’s true score falls, rather 
than only a score, underlies both the appropriate use of intellectual and 
adaptive behavior assessment instruments and best diagnostic 
practices.”89 
Moreover, the U.S. Supreme Court established that the Florida 
Supreme Court’s narrow interpretation of section 921.137(1) conflicts 
with accepted medical practice.90 Florida’s inflexible rule “takes an IQ 
score as final and conclusive evidence of a defendant’s intellectual 
capacity, when experts in the field would consider other evidence” and 
relies on the defendant’s IQ score, while refusing to recognize that this 
score is an imprecise measurement.91 
 
83 APA Brief, supra note 81, at 22. 
84 Hall, 134 S. Ct. at 1992. 
85 APA Brief, supra note 81, at 23. 
86 Id. 
87 Id. at 24. 
88 Id. 
89 Id. 
90 Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986, 1995 (2014). 
91 Id. 
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The AAIDD establishes that “[g]enerally, an IQ test score of around 
70 or as high as 75 indicates a limitation in intellectual functioning.”92 
Also, the AAIDD confirms that while an IQ score is one way to 
measure intellectual functioning, it is not the only method.93 By 
limiting a defendant’s ability to present evidence of his alleged 
intellectual disability based on a strict IQ cutoff, this prevents 
sentencing courts from considering “substantial and weighty evidence 
of intellectual disability as measured and made manifest by the 
defendant’s failure or inability to adapt to his social and cultural 
environment, including medical histories, behavioral records, school 
tests and reports, and testimony regarding past behavior and family 
circumstances.”94 For instance, a defendant who earns an IQ score 
above 70 may still be properly diagnosed as intellectually disabled if 
he exhibits significant adaptive functioning limitations.95 Thus, that 
defendant’s “actual functioning is comparable to that of individuals 
with a lower IQ score.”96 
B. Florida’s Rule Infringes upon Capital Defendants’ Eighth 
Amendment Rights 
Second, the Court reasoned that the Florida Supreme Court’s 
interpretation of section 921.137(1) infringes upon an individual’s 
Eighth Amendment rights because it (1) does not serve a legitimate 
penological purpose97 and (2) fails to protect the veracity of the trial 
process.98 Imposing the death penalty on an intellectually disabled 
person equates to the harshest punishment and, as a result, violates that 
individual’s inherent dignity as a human being.99 
“The Eighth Amendment’s protection of dignity reflects the Nation 
we have been, the Nation we are, and the Nation we aspire to be.”100 
In criminal law, there are three justifications for punishment: 
 
92 Definition of Intellectual Disability, AM. ASS’N OF INTELL. & DEVELOPMENTAL 
DISABILITIES, http://www.aaidd.org/intellectual-disability/definition#.VGfnLJPF-1J (last 
visited Feb. 5, 2016). 
93 Id. 
94 Hall, 134 S. Ct. at 1994. 
95 Id. at 1994–95. 
96 Id. at 1995 (quoting AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL 
MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS (DSM-5) 37 (5th ed. 2013)). 
97 Id. at 1992. 
98 Id. at 1993. 
99 Id. at 2001. 
100 Id. at 1992. 
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rehabilitation, deterrence, and retribution.101 While rehabilitation 
cannot justify the death penalty,102 sentencing an intellectually 
disabled person to death serves neither a deterrent nor retributive value 
either. Deterrence is “the interest in preventing capital crimes by 
prospective offenders.”103 With respect to intellectually disabled 
defendants, deterrence does not support the death penalty because 
intellectually disabled individuals lack the capacity to engage in logical 
reasoning.104 Due to the inability to engage in logical reasoning, an 
intellectually disabled individual is unable to process information and 
acknowledge that his actions may result in such severe sanctions.105 
Accordingly, an intellectually disabled person is powerless to alter his 
behavior to avoid such punishment since he is unable to appreciate the 
likely consequences of his actions.106 
Furthermore, executing an intellectually disabled defendant does not 
serve a retributive purpose.107 Retribution is described as “the interest 
in seeing that the offender gets his ‘just deserts.’”108 Thus, to determine 
if imposing the death penalty has retributive value, one must ascertain 
whether the death penalty is the appropriate punishment for the 
defendant’s past criminal offenses. For that reason, imposing the 
extreme sanction of the death penalty on an intellectually disabled 
defendant is not justified by a retributive purpose because an 
intellectually disabled defendant has a lower moral culpability than the 
“average murderer.”109 
Additionally, Florida’s bright-line rule increases the likelihood that 
intellectually disabled persons will be executed, which damages the 
integrity of the trial process.110 According to Atkins, intellectually 
disabled individuals “face a special risk of wrongful execution” 
because they are inclined to confess to crimes they did not commit and 
often fail to give their counsel meaningful assistance.111 While it is 
permissible for an intellectually disabled defendant to stand trial and be 
 
101 Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 420 (2008). 
102 Hall, 134 S. Ct. at 1992–93. 
103 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 319 (2002). 
104 Hall, 134 S. Ct. at 1993 (citing Atkins, 536 U.S. at 320). 
105 Id. 
106 Id. 
107 Atkins, 536 U.S. at 319. 
108 Id. 
109 Hall, 134 S. Ct. at 1993 (quoting Atkins, 536 U.S. at 319). 
110 Id. 
111 Id. at 1993 (quoting Atkins, 536 U.S. at 320–21). 
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punished for his criminal actions, the defendant should not be subjected 
to the most severe sentence: the death penalty.112 
C. Other States’ Interpretations of Evaluating Intellectual Disability 
of Capital Defendants Conflicts with Florida’s Interpretation 
Third, in making its decision, the Court considered other states’ 
varied interpretations of how intellectual disability should be 
evaluated. “A significant majority of States implement the protections 
of Atkins by taking the SEM into account, thus acknowledging the error 
inherent in using a test score without necessary adjustment.”113 The 
sizable amount of states that consider the impreciseness of IQ scores 
influenced the Court’s decision that Florida should also afford 
defendants a sufficient opportunity to provide proof when bringing 
intellectual disability claims.114 
In nineteen states and the District of Columbia, the death penalty has 
been abolished in full or for new offenses.115 Additionally, Oregon and 
Washington have imposed a moratorium on the death penalty.116 The 
Court expounds on the idea that “in 41 States an individual in Hall’s 
position—an individual with an IQ score of 71—would not be deemed 
automatically eligible for the death penalty.”117 Consequently, had 
Hall committed the offense in one of the states where the death penalty 
has been abolished or suspended, he would not have been sentenced to 
death, even if the Court was unable to find that Hall possessed an 
intellectual disability. The Court rendered the Hall decision in 
consideration of the majority of states’ rejection of death penalty 
sentencing and the increasing recognition of SEM, which furthers the 
idea that a strict IQ score cutoff is improper.118 
Through the Hall decision, the U.S. Supreme Court concluded that 
Florida’s statutory definition of intellectual disability, which requires 
satisfaction of an IQ score of 70 or below to present additional evidence 
 
112 Id. (citing Atkins, 536 U.S. at 306, 318). 
113 Id. at 1996. 
114 Id. at 1996–98. 
115 States With and Without the Death Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/states-and-without-death-penalty (last visited Feb. 5, 
2016). 
116 Ian Lovett, Executions Are Suspended by Governor in Washington, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 
12, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/12/us/washington-governor-jay-inslee-sus 
pends-death-penalty.html?_r=1. 
117 Hall, 134 S. Ct. at 1997. 
118 Id. at 1998. 
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of deficient adaptive behavior, is unconstitutional.119 This decision 
furthered Atkins’ precedent that it is unconstitutional to execute the 
intellectually disabled, emphasized the mental health profession’s 
perspective, and considered the statute’s social and moral 
consequences. 
IV 
IMPLICATIONS OF HALL 
The implications of the Hall decision could potentially impact state 
legislatures’ development and interpretation of intellectual disability 
definitions, as well as courts’ caseloads of intellectual disability 
defense claims to death penalty sentencing. Further, Hall could have 
immediate consequences for inmates currently on death row. 
A. States Remain Tasked with Defining the Scope of Intellectual 
Disability Definition 
The U.S. Supreme Court rejected Florida’s bright-line IQ score 
cutoff, a cutoff that essentially created a blanket restriction on capital 
defendants’ ability to present further evidence of intellectual 
disability.120 Furthermore, Hall created a precedent that standard of 
error measurements should be taken into account when assessing 
mental capability to account for IQ testing imprecisions.121 Now, states 
retain the task of defining the scope of intellectual disability while 
ensuring compliance with both Hall and the constitutional restriction 
on imposing death penalty sentences on intellectually disabled 
persons.122 In doing so, states must avoid implementing IQ score 
cutoffs that set a blanket restriction on adaptive functioning evidence 
while also taking into account the impreciseness inherent in IQ testing. 
However, the Court’s decision does not provide a clear direction for 
states as they alter or reformulate their statutes defining intellectual 
disability. This lack of clarity is likely to result in confusion. For 
example, the Court’s ruling did not eliminate the possibility that states 
can still use IQ scores as part of the analysis of a defendant’s 
intellectual functioning. Additionally, the Court does not explicitly 
 
119 Id. at 2001. 
120 Id. 
121 Id. at 2000. 
122 Id. at 2001. 
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confirm whether a state is permitted to set a fixed score, such as 75 or 
above, and use this score as a measure of intellectual ability. 
Instead, the Court only narrowly stresses that the use of IQ scores 
must account for the “inherent imprecision” of such scores.123 
Although the Court does not clearly specify how the states should 
account for such imprecisions, it is likely that states will begin to 
implement other clinical tests or assessments to evaluate a defendant’s 
intellectual disability. For instance, in response to America’s drug 
crisis, the first drug court was established in Miami-Dade County, 
Florida, in 1989, which “combin[ed] drug treatment with the structure 
and authority of the judge.”124 Due to the effectiveness of drug courts 
on lasting lifestyle and behavioral changes,125 other problem-solving 
courts have been developed based on the drug court model.126 While 
mental health court is not an institution currently flourishing in the 
criminal justice system, the National Association of Drug Court 
Professionals perceives that it is a promising program.127 The mental 
health courts that currently exist are voluntary programs that “divert 
select defendants with mental illnesses into judicially supervised, 
community-based treatment.”128 Thus, it is possible that states will 
begin to implement more widespread use of mental health courts in 
order to create a more balanced approach to remedying the medical and 
legal difficulties of sentencing intellectually disabled defendants. 
Furthermore, states will most likely continue to rely on the expertise 
of mental health professionals to conform their intellectual disability 
standards to the current norms of mental health studies. This continued 
reliance on mental health professionals is evidenced by courts’ usage 
of experts in criminal cases.129 For instance, in Ake v. Oklahoma, the 
Court held that an indigent criminal defendant has a right to a state-
provided psychiatric evaluation and the assistance necessary to 
 
123 Id. at 2001. 
124 History: Justice Professionals Pursue a Vision, NAT’L ASS’N OF DRUG COURT 
PROF’LS, http://www.nadcp.org/learn/what-are-drug-courts/drug-court-history (last visited 
Feb. 5, 2016). 
125 Id. 
126 Problem Solving Courts: Addressing a Spectrum of Issues. . . , NAT’L ASS’N OF DRUG 
COURT PROF’LS, http://www.nadcp.org/learn/what-are-drug-courts/models/problem               
-solving-courts (last visited Feb. 5, 2016). 
127 Id. 
128 Id. 
129 W. Neil Gowensmith et al., Forensic Mental Health Evaluations: Reliability, Validity, 
Quality, and Other Minor Details, THE JURY EXPERT: THE ART & SCI. OF LITIG. ADVOC., 
Jan./Feb. 2013, at 1, http://www.thejuryexpert.com/2013/01/forensic-mental-health-evalua 
tions-reliability-validity-quality-and-other-minor-details/. 
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establish an effective defense based on his mental condition.130 The 
Court noted that in cases where a defendant’s mental health is 
“seriously in question[,] . . . a defense may be devastated by the absence 
of a psychiatric examination and testimony; with such assistance, the 
defendant might have a reasonable chance of success.”131 As a result 
of the Ake decision, the Court established a mental health expert’s 
potential role in providing a defendant with “[m]eaningful access to 
justice.”132 Furthermore, the American Bar Association (ABA) also 
recognizes the role of mental health experts in the criminal process.133 
The ABA acknowledges that mental health experts serve the 
administration of criminal justice by providing expert opinions and 
testimony relating to their scientific, evaluative, consultative, 
treatment, and habilitation roles.134 More specifically, the ABA 
standards also provide that the judicial, legal, and mental health 
agencies and organizations “have an obligation to work cooperatively 
to monitor the interdependent performance within the criminal process 
of their members and constituents and to improve the overall quality of 
the administration of justice in criminal cases involving mental health 
and mental retardation issues.”135 Accordingly, the prominence and 
usefulness of mental health experts in criminal proceedings 
substantiates the idea that such experts will help state legislatures 
scrutinize procedures and determine the most viable intellectual 
disability definition. Thus, despite legal professionals’ limited 
understanding of mental health, experts’ unique knowledge of the 
complexities of psychology will ensure that intellectually disabled 
persons will be better served by the criminal justice system. 
B. The Confusion and Slippery Slope of the Hall Decision 
The Hall case may lead to a slippery slope of increased litigation and 
disagreement regarding intellectual disability–assessment standards. 
The dissent indicates that the Court was essentially “adopt[ing] a 
uniform national rule that is both conceptually unsound and likely to 
 
130 Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 82–83 (1985). 
131 Id. 
132 Id. at 77. 
133 See Mental Health, Mental Retardation, and Criminal Justice: General Professional 
Obligations, A.B.A., http://www.americanbar.org/publications/criminal_justice_section 
_archive/crimjust_standards_mentalhealth_blk.html (last visited Feb. 5, 2016). 
134 Id. at Standard 7-1.1. 
135 Id. at Standard 7-1.2. 
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result in confusion.”136 Additionally, the dissent opines that the Court 
departs from Eighth Amendment case law, which focuses on objective 
factors to diagnose intellectual disability.137 As a result, the dissent 
disapproves of the Court’s reliance on the views of professional 
associations since the validity of their findings regarding intellectual 
disability are constantly changing.138 
Thus, the slippery-slope effect of the Hall decision directs our 
attention and fears about the instant case to future problematic cases.139 
The ambiguous holding may lead to a slippery slope, where defendants 
whose IQ scores are 76 or higher will attempt to bring claims that their 
test score should not be conclusive evidence of intellectual functioning. 
Furthermore, increased litigation may be spurred by capital defendants’ 
recognition that the judiciary may not be a suitable entity for 
determining which professional organization’s views the courts should 
defer to. If a rigid cutoff is not implemented, it is probable that the 
floodgates for intellectual-disability claims will open and capital 
defendants will demand more comprehensive mental health 
evaluations. In effect, this will force state legislatures to continually 
return to the drawing board to create a new intellectual disability 
standard. 
C. Hall’s Impact on Current Death Row Inmates 
The Hall decision has practical implications as well. Eliminating the 
bright-line IQ threshold may clear the pathway for death penalty 
inmates to pursue their intellectual disability claims. For example, in 
two current Virginia cases, two defendants who previously raised 
intellectual disability claims on their road to death row are asserting 
that the Hall decision aids their claims.140 Yet, a judge from Georgia’s 
Towaliga Judicial Circuit recently ruled that death row inmate Warren 
Lee Hill failed to meet the state’s requirement to prove intellectual 
disability beyond a reasonable doubt as to bar execution.141 Based on 
 
136 Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986, 2002 (2014) (Alito, J., dissenting). 
137 Id. 
138 Id. at 2006. 
139 See Frederick Schauer, Slippery Slopes, 99 HARV. L. REV. 361, 369 (1985). 
140 Robert Barnes & Matt Zapotosky, Supreme Court Strikes Down Florida Law on 
Intellectually Disabled Death Row Inmates, WASH. POST (May 27, 2014), http://www 
.washingtonpost.com/politics/supreme-court-strikes-florida-law-on-intellectually-disabled 
-death-row-inmates/2014/05/27/45cda4f4-e5ab-11e3-8f90-73e071f3d637_story.html. 
141 Bradley McAllister, Georgia Judge Denies Death Row Inmate’s Challenge to State 
Intellectual Disability Standard, JURIST (Oct. 2, 2014), http://jurist.org/paperchase/2014 
/10/judge-denies-inmates-challenge-to-intellectual-disability-burden-of-proof.php. 
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Hall, which focuses on the impreciseness of psychiatric diagnoses, 
Georgia’s high standard for proving intellectual disability could 
potentially be deemed an impossible standard to meet, and reduced 
accordingly. 
However, the actual number of inmates eligible to qualify for new 
hearings is unclear. While one article asserts that “[a]n estimated 10 to 
20 inmates could be eligible,”142 another article published by the same 
newspaper claimed that “[t]he ruling affects roughly 30 death row 
inmates.”143 Despite the lack of clarity over the actual number of 
inmates eligible for new hearings, death row inmates from states that 
fail to go beyond using a single IQ test result to determine intellectual 
disability may be able to seek reconsideration of their sentences.144 
Thus, the ruling in Hall may allow certain capital defendants to pursue 
their intellectual disability claims in order to avoid death penalty 
sentencing. 
V 
SUGGESTIONS FOR THE FUTURE 
The Hall decision has carved increased access for defendants to raise 
intellectual disability claims and has forced states to reconsider their 
interpretation of intellectual disability statutes regarding IQ scores. The 
following suggestions outline methods that states can use to resolve 
evidentiary problems of identifying defendants who are intellectually 
disabled, which include considering intellectual functioning factors, 
implementing revised diagnosis methods, and establishing a panel 
composed of mental health professionals to provide an impartial and 
thorough evaluation of capital defendants. Each of the suggestions 
involve melding the most current findings in mental health science with 
the criminal justice system since “[m]any Atkins cases [which involve 
capital defendants claiming intellectual disability as a defense to the 
death penalty] turn on unscientific expert opinion, stereotype, and 
mischaracterization of the disability.”145 
 
142 Lizette Alvarez & John Schwartz, I.Q. Cutoff Ruling May Spare Some Inmates on 
Death Row, N.Y. TIMES (May 28, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/29/us/supreme 
-court-strikes-down-floridas-strict-iq-cutoff-for-executions.html?_r=0. 
143  Lizette Alvarez & John Schwartz, On Death Row With Low I.Q., and New Hope for 
a Reprieve, N.Y. TIMES (May 30, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/31/us/on-death 
-row-with-low-iq-and-new-hope-for-a-reprieve.html. 
144 Id. 
145 Nancy Haydt, Intellectual Disability: A Digest of Complex Concepts in Atkins 
Proceedings, CHAMPION, Jan./Feb. 2014, at 44. 
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A. Briseno Factors to Guide Courts in Assessing Adaptive 
Functioning of Capital Defendants 
Texas courts have used seven nonscientific factors, termed Briseno 
factors, to guide sentencing courts as to the types of evidence that a 
court may consider when assessing adaptive functioning.146 The 
Briseno factors are a unique approach because Texas is the sole state 
that insists on considering additional factors, some unrelated to the 
original crime, to test for intellectual functioning.147 Accordingly, the 
Briseno factors permit the execution of a defendant if “the court 
determines the criminal offense required forethought, planning and 
complex execution.”148 The Briseno factors were developed based on 
the AAIDD’s clinical standards and are as follows: 
 • Did those who knew the [defendant] best during the 
developmental stage . . . think he was mentally retarded at the time, 
and, if so, act in accordance with that determination? 
 • Has the [defendant] formulated plans and carried them through 
or is his conduct impulsive? 
 • Does [defendant’s] conduct show leadership or does it show 
that he is led around by others? 
 • Is [defendant’s] conduct in response to external stimuli rational 
and appropriate, regardless of whether it is socially acceptable? 
 • Does [defendant] respond coherently, rationally, and on point 
to oral or written questions or do his responses wander from subject 
to subject? 
 • Can [defendant] hide facts or lie effectively in his own or 
others’ interests? 
 • Putting aside any heinousness or gruesomeness surrounding the 
capital offence, did the commission of that offense require 
forethought, planning, and complex execution of purpose?149 
Although the Hall Court evaluated the first prong of the intellectual 
disability definition—intellectual functioning, as opposed to adaptive 
functioning, as assessed under the Briseno factors—a similar approach 
could be taken to examine intellectual functioning. Because intellectual 
 
146 Ex parte Briseno, 135 S.W.3d 1, 8–9 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). 
147 Intellectual Disabilities: Texas Stands Alone in Its Unusual Test of Mental 
Retardation and Exemption from Execution, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., http://www 
.deathpenaltyinfo.org/intellectual-disabilities-texas-stands-alone-its-unusual-test-mental      
-retardation-and-exemption-execu (last visited Feb. 5, 2016). 
148 Id. 
149 Briseno, 135 S.W.3d at 8–9. 
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functioning refers to general mental capacity, such as learning, 
reasoning, and problem solving, a set of factors could also be developed 
to personalize and further develop the meaning of IQ test results. 
Unlike a standardized IQ test, administered to evaluate an individual’s 
intellectual functioning and resulting in a test score composed of a 
single number as a means to gauge one’s intellect, the Briseno factors 
merely act as a guideline to evaluate adaptive functioning. 
If Texas implemented Florida’s rigid IQ requirement to evaluate a 
capital defendant’s intellectual functioning, that requirement could 
potentially bar his adaptive functioning from being assessed under the 
Briseno factors. To avoid this blanket restriction on proving adaptive 
functioning, states could broaden the analysis of the intellectual 
functioning prong. For instance, to supplement his IQ results, the 
defendant could be questioned to determine how his intellectual 
functioning relates to the original crime committed. By assessing the 
defendant’s intellectual functioning based on Briseno-style factors, this 
would allow the court to have a better understanding of the defendant’s 
ability to reason, plan, and communicate in the commission of the 
crime. Ultimately, this could provide the court with a more balanced 
evaluation. 
Alternatively, the intellectual and adaptive functioning prongs could 
be merged. Instead of viewing the prongs as separate, and the 
fulfillment of the intellectual functioning prong as a requirement to 
analyze adaptive functioning, both intellectual and adaptive 
functioning could be evaluated together. For example, a court could 
consider the defendant’s IQ range for intellectual functioning and 
balance the defendant’s IQ range with his adaptive functioning, gauged 
under the Briseno factors. Thus, a defendant that exhibits a higher IQ, 
but severely lacks adaptive functioning skills under the Briseno factors, 
could still be considered intellectually disabled. Similarly, a defendant 
that has a low IQ, yet has sufficient adaptive functioning to make him 
culpable of the criminal offense committed, could be considered 
mentally fit to be sentenced to death. Consequently, this approach 
would allow the court to utilize a test that balances intellectual and 
adaptive functioning in determining a defendant’s intellectual 
disability. Furthermore, merging the prongs is also fair to the defendant 
because sufficient intellectual functioning based on an IQ score will not 
pose as a blanket restriction to assessing the adaptive functioning 
prong. 
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B. Developing the Three Branches of Learning to Attain a More 
Accurate Gauge of Intellectual-Disability Diagnosis 
The most commonly administered IQ test is the Wechsler Adult 
Intelligence Scale (WAIS) test,150 which measures verbal 
comprehension, perceptual reasoning, working memory, and 
processing speed.151 While the WAIS test is expansive and tests both 
verbal and spatial functioning, the test does not evaluate the three types 
of learning that intellectually disabled persons are troubled by: 
academic, experiential, and social learning.152 
First, academic learning includes useful skills and knowledge 
obtained through formal education, including reading, writing, and 
math.153 Second, experiential learning occurs though cause and effect, 
where an individual learns to avoid a painful experience or to be 
intrigued by a rewarding experience.154 Third, social learning is 
developed through an individual’s observation of other people 
interacting in social situations, which may include social customs such 
as greeting someone by shaking his hand.155 Beyond learning 
problems, intellectually disabled individuals also experience limited 
emotional functioning. Thus, an intellectually disabled person often 
exhibits a “child-like innocence, trust, wonder, and sincerity,” and this 
emotional immaturity makes them more “vulnerable to victimization 
and cruelty.”156 
Factors relating to the three branches of learning could thus be 
developed to more effectively evaluate the defendant and determine the 
extent of his intellectual disability. And while academic learning can 
be sufficiently evaluated by a standardized test, experiential and social 
learning cannot. Indeed, although the WAIS test includes picture 
completion and arrangement, block design, digit symbol, and object 
 
150 John M. Grohol, IQ Test, PSYCHCENTRAL, http://psychcentral.com/encyclopedia 
/2010/what-is-an-iq-test/ (last visited Feb. 5, 2016). 
151 Maheen Chaudhry & Rebecca Ready, Differential Effects of Test Anxiety & Stress on 
the WAIS-IV, 24 J. YOUNG INVESTIGATORS 60, 60 (2012), http://www.jyi.org/wp-content 
/uploads/Differential-Effects-of-Test-Anxiety-Stress-on-the-WAIS-IV.pdf. 
152 Tammy Reynolds et al., Intellectual Functioning (Mental Abilities), CMTY. 
COUNSELING SERVS., INC., http://www.communitycounselingservices.org/poc/view_doc 
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assembly,157 this performance scale is too narrow to assess an 
individual’s propensity to learn social customs and to avoid or pursue 
painful or rewarding experiences, respectively. Unlike academic 
learning, social and experiential learning are unique to each individual 
and cannot be accurately measured by the WAIS test. Hence, it is 
recommended that simulations be developed where the administrator 
can assess the test taker’s actual reaction to social situations involving 
other people. Additionally, when state legislatures are developing 
revised definitions of intellectual disability and evaluation methods, 
they should consider the defendant’s experiential- and social-learning 
capacity. 
Because intellectual disability diagnosis focuses on the interaction 
between the person and his environment, it is necessary “to examine an 
individual’s intellectual disability as it manifests within the particular 
context of interest and with respect to the functional demands of that 
person’s social environment.”158 Merely focusing on the sufficiency of 
a defendant’s academic skills, which include knowledge, vocabulary, 
and mathematics, does not justify treating intellectually disabled 
persons differently during capital punishment sentencing.159 Thus, 
creating a more extensive test that emphasizes actual social 
interactions, rather than relying on IQ tests and subjective question-
based evaluations, could provide both states and courts with a more 
thorough understanding of intellectual disability. 
C. Developing a More Comprehensive Test Based on the Diagnostic 
and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders and Diagnostic Adaptive 
Behavior Scale 
Furthermore, courts may reference the fifth edition of the Diagnostic 
and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-5), which has a 
revised diagnosis of intellectual disability.160 Unlike older editions, the 
DSM-5 focuses on evaluating conditions that address the impact of an 
intellectual disability on a person’s functioning and includes critical 
improvements to encourage a more comprehensive patient 
 
157 JEROME M. SATTLER & JOSEPH J. RYAN, ASSESSMENT WITH THE WAIS-IV 56 (Sally 
Lifland & Quica Ostrander eds., 2009). 
158 Lois A. Weithorn, Conceptual Hurdles to the Application of Atkins v. Virginia, 59 
HASTINGS L.J. 1203, 1211 (2008). 
159 Id. at 1212. 
160 AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-5 INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY FACT SHEET 1 (2013), 
http://www.dsm5.org/documents/intellectual%20disability%20fact%20sheet.pdf. 
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assessment.161 Moreover, courts may also be interested in the 
AAIDD’s new Diagnostic Adaptive Behavior Scale (DABS). This 
assessment was developed to diagnose intellectual disability and 
determine eligibility for “[s]pecific treatment within the criminal 
justice system.”162 DABS will provide a comprehensive, standardized 
evaluation of an individual’s adaptive behavior.163 Three domains are 
evaluated to assess an individual’s intelligence, which include 
conceptual, social, and practical.164 To analyze the individual’s three 
domains, both clinical assessment and standardized testing of 
intelligence are emphasized. Additionally, “[t]he DABS focuses on the 
critical ‘cut-off area’ for the purpose of ruling in or ruling out a 
diagnosis of intellectual disability or related developmental 
disability.”165 
While the “cut-off area” may seem rigid, like Florida’s intellectual 
disability statute, the DABS is a standard developed by the AAIDD 
with the intent of being used by mental health professionals, which 
include “school psychologists, forensic psychologists, clinical 
psychologists, psychometricians, social workers, occupational 
therapists, and pediatricians, as well as officials in disability-related 
government agencies.”166 Lastly, unlike the Florida statute deemed 
unconstitutional in Hall, DSM-5 and DABS emphasizes that the 
severity of impairment is based on adaptive functioning, rather than 
intellectual functioning alone. 
D. Implementing a Mental Health and Medical Professional Panel to 
Provide the Courts with Explanations Regarding Intellectual 
Disability and Recommendations Pertaining to Diagnosis 
Based on Hall, it appears that the Court has and will continue to take 
a positive view of psychiatric and mental health professionals, most 
notably the American Psychiatric Association. In regard to the views 
of medical experts, Justice Kennedy asserts that “[t]hese views do not 
 
161 Id. 
162 FAQ on  AAIDD’s  New Diagnostic Adaptive Behavior Scale, AM. ASS’N OF INTELL. 
& DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES, https://aaidd.org/intellectual-disability/diagnostic             
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dictate the Court’s decision, yet the Court does not disregard these 
informed assessments.”167 Despite the Court’s claim that its judgment 
was not determined by medical experts, the Court concedes that “[t]he 
legal determination of intellectual disability is distinct from a medical 
diagnosis, but it is informed by the medical community’s diagnostic 
framework,” and that “the professional community’s teachings are of 
particular help in this case, where no alternative definition of 
intellectual disability is presented and where this Court and the States 
have placed substantial reliance on the expertise of the medical 
profession.”168 Accordingly, the Court cites the APA’s amicus brief at 
length169 and considers the medical community’s perspective in 
rendering its decision. Consequently, to evaluate whether an individual 
is intellectually disabled, it would be advantageous to create a panel 
composed of medical and mental health professionals to analyze capital 
defendants’ intellectual disability claims. 
In 1876, the American Association on Mental Retardation (AAMR) 
was founded in an effort “to promote the systematic study and 
classification of mental retardation and advocacy for those 
affected.”170 Currently, the AAMR continues to be “the most 
influential professional organization in the field,”171 and its 
contributions to scholarly and clinical findings are unprecedented. The 
APA has also proved influential in the field of intellectual disability 
studies and “reflect[s] the psychiatric profession’s consensus on the 
diagnostic features of mental retardation.”172 Because an intellectual 
disability diagnosis is expansive and is characterized by significant 
limitations in both intellectual functioning and adaptive behavior,173 
gathering input from a range of professionals from the various subsets 
of psychology is beneficial to develop a thorough and informed 
analysis. Hence, the panel could be composed of an array of mental 
health professionals belonging to the aforementioned associations. 
Mental health professionals will be able to provide valuable insight 
that is not provided by a standardized IQ test. The AAIDD emphasizes 
that additional factors must be accounted for when assessing 
 
167 Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986, 2000 (2014). 
168 Id. 
169 Id. passim. 
170 93  AM. JUR. TRIALS 1, supra note 12, at § 6. 
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172 Id. 
173 AM. ASS’N OF INTELL. & DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES, supra note 92. 
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intellectual disability, which include “community environment typical 
of the individual’s peers and culture,” as well as “linguistic diversity 
and cultural differences in the way people communicate, move, and 
behave.”174 By having a panel consisting of mental health experts 
specializing in various subsets of psychology, this will provide courts 
with a more individualized evaluation of each defendant. Further, 
implementing a panel to help determine a defendant’s mental capacity 
will help to maintain a more impartial assessment, as opposed to an 
expert witness called by a single party. Although courts are responsible 
for sentencing and are the ultimate decision makers in determining 
whether a defendant is considered intellectually disabled, a panel 
would be beneficial since medical and mental health professionals 
reflect the society’s best understanding of the fields that they represent. 
Writing for the dissent in Hall, Justice Alito strongly criticized the 
majority’s reliance on current medical theories.175 Justice Alito 
asserted that the “views of professional associations often change” and 
force courts “to judge the validity of each new change.”176 In spite of 
the dissent’s criticism of the volatility of relying on medical experts, 
the presence of mental health experts in courtrooms for criminal 
proceedings is frequent. For example, assistance by mental health 
experts is authorized by the statutes or case precedent in most states; 
regularly considered by criminal courts in case adjudication; and often 
acquired by defense attorneys, prosecutors, and defendants claiming 
intellectual disability.177 
State statutory provisions for mental health expert assistance to 
criminal defendants seem to have, expressly or implicitly, two 
objectives: (1) to provide a broad plan of criminal defenses by 
providing mental health expertise to defendants financially unable to 
obtain such services; and (2) to give assistance to trial courts in 
adjudication and disposition of cases in which questions of mental 
aberration arise.178 
While mental health expert assistance may be either defense-related, 
court-related, or both, implementing a panel of mental health and 
medical professionals would likely serve both of these purposes. A 
 
174 Id. 
175 Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986, 2006 (2014) (Alito, J., dissenting). 
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177 Pamela Casey & Ingo Keilitz, An Evaluation of Mental Health Expert Assistance 
Provided to Indigent Criminal Defendants: Organization, Administration, and Fiscal 
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panel will not only guarantee capital defendants access to competent 
mental health professionals, but will also guide courts in rendering 
decisions regarding intellectual disability claims. 
Furthermore, Justice Alito’s apprehension of relying on mental 
health professionals due to the risk of potential changes in professional 
views does not outweigh the consequences of not considering these 
viewpoints. Despite Justice Alito’s fear of unpredictable changes in the 
mental health community regarding intellectual disability diagnosis, 
considering a panel’s findings would allow the courts to make 
decisions pertaining to capital defendants that align with the most up-
to-date diagnostic methods. 
To avoid confusion over appointing members to the panel, the 
legislature could develop requisite qualifications for the experts. These 
qualifications would ensure that the expert is competent—meaning that 
he has certain educational credentials and experience—and is 
independent—meaning that he is not an advocate for the prosecution 
any more than he is for the defense.179 Furthermore, by creating a panel 
whose members are subject to a specific term and hail from various 
respected professional associations, this will make certain that the 
members’ opinions reflect the most recent and reliable mental health 
standards. 
While states still maintain the freedom to create and enforce their 
own definitions of intellectual disability, this freedom continues to be 
diminished by decisions such as Hall. In an effort to comply with the 
Hall decision, state legislatures must develop fair definitions and 
procedures for determining whether defendants are eligible to be 
recognized as intellectually disabled in the criminal justice system. To 
avoid the same fate as the rigid Florida rule, states do not have to 
completely abandon standardized IQ tests, but states should 
supplement these tests to remedy their intrinsic impreciseness and to 
account for additional environmental factors. By melding the criminal 
justice system’s inclination to enforce inflexible standards with the 
mental health professional community’s continuously developing 
guidelines, this will afford defendants a greater degree of personalized 
evaluation. 
 
179 See generally id. at 48–49. 
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CONCLUSION 
In John Steinbeck’s classic novel Of Mice and Men, Steinbeck 
emphasizes how, despite the physical strength of a man, Lennie, he 
remained powerless due to his intellectual circumstances.180 After 
Lennie accidentally kills a puppy and a woman, Steinbeck illustrates, 
“Lennie went back and looked at the dead girl. The puppy lay close to 
her. Lennie picked it up. ‘I’ll throw him away,’ he said. ‘It’s bad 
enough like it is.’”181 While Lennie knows that he has done a bad thing, 
his innocence, stemming from his intellectual disability, prevents him 
from understanding the severity of the woman’s death compared to that 
of the puppy. Steinbeck’s 1937 fictional novel draws upon the focal 
point of the 2014 Hall opinion. Intellectual disability is variable and 
often factors into an individual’s propensity to engage in criminal 
activity. It is therefore difficult to diagnose intellectual disability and 
determine the effect of reduced mental capacity on a defendant’s 
culpability. 
The Hall case seeks to remedy the inadequate understanding of the 
effect of intellectual disability on criminal behavior. This case not only 
attempts to strike a balance between the intellectually disabled 
community and the criminal justice system, but also solidifies the 
importance of mental health professionals in intellectual-disability 
determinations. Hall, however, unclearly dictates how state legislatures 
should proceed to modify their intellectual-disability statutes, besides 
ruling that a 70-point threshold is too rigid and thus unconstitutional. 
While state legislatures will likely have to create a new standard for 
determining whether a defendant is intellectually disabled on a trial and 
error basis, it is apparent that the intellectually disabled community will 
be provided with more individualized mental health evaluations. This 
change may remedy the disadvantages in the criminal justice system 
that these individuals have faced in the past. 
Justice Kennedy wrote, “Intellectual disability is a condition, not a 
number.”182 Because the once coveted standardized IQ test is slowly 
becoming merely a factor and not determinative of mental capacity, it 
is time to align the criminal justice system with interests of the mental 
health profession. Some may be fearful of the often-changing findings 
in mental health science and the resulting volatile effect on states’ 
intellectual disability definitions. These changes, however, must be 
 
180 JOHN STEINBECK, OF MICE AND MEN 92 (Penguin Books 1993) (1937). 
181 Id. 
182 Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986, 2001 (2014). 
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accounted for in trying and sentencing intellectually disabled 
defendants to avoid cruel and unusual punishments. Thus, the state 
legislatures should model their definitions of intellectual disability on 
current mental health findings because “[s]ociety relies upon medical 
and professional expertise to define and explain how to diagnose the 
mental condition at issue”183 and to provide a more complete and 
impartial mental health assessment of capital defendants. 
  
 
183 Id. at 1993. 
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